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INTRODUCTION

One of the more celebrated myths about the American West is the
great war between cattlemen and sheepmen over grazing rights. Like
many such myths, it sharply distorts the reality of Western history;
more blood was shed in battles over the use of water than the use of
land.' The struggle over water rights did not end in the late nineteenth
century. It has continued, as one historian predicted years ago, into the
present, since even minor changes in the allocation of water uses invite
"careful scrutiny" and new conflict.2
In the forefront of more recent battles over water use are proposals
by coal companies and electric utilities to move coal from western
mines to distant markets via slurry pipelines.3 Slurry lobbyists seek
1.

Cf., K.R. TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS 167 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

TOOLE].

2.

W.P. WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 499-552 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WEBB].

3. The technology of coal slurry pipelines has been examined in depth by several
authorities, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, COAL SLURRY PIPELINES: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS FOR NEW ONES (April 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]. Basically, the slurry process involves crushing mined
coal into a fine powder, and mixing the powder with water to make slurry. The slurry is
then pumped over several miles in underground lines to its final destination, usually a coal
fired generating plant. A centrifuge process separates the coal from the water. The coal is
burned for fuels, while the water is used as a coolant in the plant. Id. at 3. For an analysis
of economic considerations, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A TECHNOLOGY
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federal legislation granting rights of eminent domain to energy consortia to accelerate construction of these pipelines. 4 Much of the debate
over this legislation has focused on the controversial subject of water
rights.5 There is no indication that this debate has ended, especially
since the demand to mine and market coal in the most economical
fashion has become increasingly important.6
While several states have welcomed the construction of coal slurry
pipelines by granting state eminent domain powers and rights to
water,7 Montana has placed a major roadblock in the way of operating
a pipeline by legislating an absolute prohibition on access to water supplies.8 This Comment will examine the purpose underlying Montana's
relatively unique statute through a study of its legislative history. The
possibility of a successful challenge to the statute under the Commerce
Clause9 will also be explored. Finally, the impact of federal coal slurry
legislation on state water law will be reviewed. Ultimately, this Comment seeks to clarify legal and political problems associated with the
development of coal slurry pipelines. Lessons learned from the Montana experience should prove critical to a better understanding of state
interests in the national energy debate.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MONTANA STATUTE

A.

The Concernfor Water Resources in Montana

Water law has increasingly occupied the attention of Montanans
since the early 1970's. Lawmakers have attempted to provide for beneficial or non-wasteful uses for the state's waters and to balance conflicting demands for water use-rights among various interests.' 0 This
concern has been heightened by (1) fears of federally-sanctioned depleASSESSMENT OF COAL SLURRY PIPELINES (September 1980) [hereinafter cited as OTA
REPORT].

4. See infra text accompanying notes 119-159.
5. Id., especially notes 134-152.
6. According "to researchers for the World Coal Study, coal must and will provide up
to two-thirds of world energy sources by the year 2000. Overall use should increase to 34.6
percent of all energy sources by that time, as opposed to the current (1977) figure of 18.5
percent. Coal- Fuel ofthe Future, NEwswEMc, May 19, 1980, at 65-66:
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 361.08 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-19-12 (1978); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.721 to 723 (West) (1981); Tnx NAT. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 2
§§ 111.0192 and 111.302 (Vernon 1978); Wyo. STAT. Ar. § 41-3-115 (1977).
8.

MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 85-2-104 (1981).

Oklahoma does not allow the use of state water from any source in any coal slurry pipeline
constructed in that state. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 7.6 (West 1980).
9.

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cL 3.

10. Montana water law is based on the "Arid Region Doctrine of Appropriation,"
which recognizes use-rights to water subject to the principles of "first in time, first in right"
and beneficial (non-wasteful) use. WEnB, supra note 2, at 435; MCA §§ 85-2-101 to 102; 852-301 (1981).
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tion of Montana waters by downstream states;" (2) the need to moderate near-insatiable demands on water for energy development;' 2 and
(3) the desire to systematically define and protect the water rights3 of
current agricultural, residential, industrial, and recreational users.
Concern culminated in provisions in the 1972 Montana Constitu-

tion providing for state ownership of waters, and requiring centralized
administration and regulation of water rights. 14 These provisions were
adopted primarily to protect claims by in-state users against the potential for competing claims by downstream users and the federal government. 5 The 1973 Legislature adopted the Montana Water Use Act 16 to
implement the constitutional mandate. Subsequent amendments have
altered the water rights adjudication process to speed the filing and
declaration of claims.' 7 The general purpose of conserving precious
water resources remains unchanged.
B.

Coal Slurry Legislation 1963-1979

In response to the needs of an ailing coal industry, the 1963 Montana Legislature adopted an amendment to its common carrier pipeline
statute granting construction and eminent domain rights for coal slurry
pipelines.' Records of the debate over this amendment are few, but
available sources reveal that the legislation was not controversial, and
that potential water-use problems were not envisioned."' Interestingly,
11. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Commerce to study the depletion of the
Ogallala Aquifer, a large water bearing stratum which stretches from Mexico to Canada,
and formulate plans for recharging the aquifer. 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-18 (1976). Montana
water is being eyed to replace the depleted stratum. Great Falls Tribune, Mar. 12, 1980, at
CIO, col. 1. Although federal authorities have assured Montanans of the priority of water
rights within the state, such assurances have not been warmly received. Ladd, Federal and
Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water Law: Supportfor a State Water Plan, 42 MONT. L.
REV. 267, 288-289 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ladd].
12. The 1971 North Central Power Study projects for increased energy development in
the Northern Great Plains, with associated demands on water, convinced the legislature to
place a moratorium on water rights applications in the Yellowstone River Basin. TOOLE,
supra note 1, at 172-175. The moratorium lasted from 1974 to 1979. MCA §§ 85-2-601 to
608 (1981).
13. Dunbar, State Water Rights Effort Has Taken Years, Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 14,
1980, at A13, col. 3; Eagle & Russell, A CentralizedSystem to Record Water Rights, Great
Falls Tribune, Sept. 21, 1980, at A13, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Eagle & Russell].
14. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
15. Eagle & Russell, supra note 13, at A13, col. 3.
16. 1973 MONT. LAWS ch. 452.
17. MCA §§ 85-2-211 to 243 (1981).
18. 1963 MONT. LAWS ch. 170, amending REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947 §§ 8-201
to 202, 204, 207, and 210 [now MCA §§ 69-13-101 to 102, 201, 302 to 303 (1981)1; Letter
from former State Sen. C. R. Thiessen to William Bronson (Dec. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Thiessen]. Mr. Thiessen was the chief sponsor of this legislation.
19. Thiessen, supra note 18; Letter from former State Sen. Ed Carney to William Bronson (Dec. 8, 1981). Mr. Carney, who co-sponsored the Thiessen amendment, believes the
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the new provisions were left gathering dust in the lawbooks, as no

slurry companies stepped forward with applications to construct
pipelines.

Initial opposition to the siting of slurry pipelines in Montana surfaced during the 1974 legislative session. Lawmakers adopted an
amendment to the Water Resources Act providing that the "use of

water for slurry to export coal from Montana is not a beneficial use20 of
water. Although the legislation nearly died after its first hearing, it was

narrowly revived by the House of Representatives 2 and forwarded to
the Senate, which gave the bill near-unanimous support. 22 Coal industry representatives did not oppose the anti-export statute;23 opposition
in the House appears to have been motivated by legislators who feared
that the bill would unnecessarily hinder industrial development in the

years to come.
The state Department of Natural Resources and Conservation

[hereinafter DNRC] tried to win support from the 1977 Legislature for
a two-year study of economic and environmental aspects of coal slurry
development.2 4 DNRC representatives alleged that coal production

was expanding beyond the capacity of railroads to transport the coal to
market, necessitating a study of slurry transportation as a possible alternative.21 During hearings, the study was opposed by railroad management and employees, who saw pipelines as unfair competitors, and
by agricultural interests fearful that pipelines would deplete scarce
water resources.2 6 Despite protests by DNRC that only a study, and

not immediate approval, of slurry pipelines was proposed, the House
Subcommittee on Water unanimously scuttled the proposal in view of
issue of water exportation was not raised. The desire to help the coal industry occupied most
if not all of the debate.
20. 1974 MONT. LAWS ch. 192.
21. Minutes of the State House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources,
February 5, 1974 (House Bill 801) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Nat. Res. Comm. Min.];
I HousE JOURNAL OF THE FORTY-THiRD LEGISLATURE 353, 372, 405 (1974) (House Bill
801).
22. Minutes of the State Senate Committee on Natural Resources, February 28, 1974
(HB 801) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Sen. Nat. Res. Comm. Min.]; 2 SENATE JOURNAL OF
THE FORTY-THRD LEGiSLATURE 612, 624 (1974) (House Bill 801).
23. 1974 Sen. Nat. Res. Comm. Min., supra note 22.
24. House Joint Resolution No. 31, 45th Mont. Legis. Sess., 1977 (Introduced Bill).
25. Minutes of the State House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Water, February 1, 1977 (testimony of Ted Doney, Chief Legal Counsel for
DNRC, on House Joint Resolution No. 31) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Subcomm.
Min.].
26. Id. (testimony of representatives from the Montana Railroad Ass'n, Burlington
Northern Ry., United Transportation Union, Western Environmental Trade Ass'n, and
Montana Farm Bureau).
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the existing state policy against export of water in slurry pipelines.2 1
Legislators took a second look at the anti-export statute in 1979.
On its face, the law clearly discriminated against interstate pipeline operation; use of water for an intrastate pipeline was not prohibited. 8
Fears were expressed that this distinction could run afoul of the federal
Commerce Clause.2 9 An amended policy was drafted to prohibit the
use of water in in-state as well as multi-state pipelines, by declaring
that all such uses were not beneficial.3" A statement of legislative findings on conservation problems associated with slurry pipelines was added by a House committee.3 1 The proposal was warmly received by a
coalition of railroad, labor, environmental, agricultural, and even business development groups, and easily won overwhelming support in the
Montana House of Representatives.3 2
The Senate Natural Resources Committee balked at the House
proposal. Several committee members expressed reservations; some
even suggested turning the bill into a pro-water export proposal, by
allowing the use of so-called "brackish" water as a transportation medium, and requiring return shipment of any slurry water to Montana. 3
These suggestions were rejected as either contradictory to legislative
procedures, or economically and technologically infeasible. 34 The
27. 1977 House Subcomm. Min., February 8, 1977. See also 1 HOUSE JOURNAL OF
THE FORTY-FiFTH LEGISLATURE 359 (1977) (House Joint Resolution No. 31).
28. The original sponsor of the anti-export law fully intended to prohibit only interstate
exportation of water. 1974 House Nat. Res. Comm. Min., supra note 21; 1974 Sen. Nat. Res.
Comm. Min., supra note 22. (Statements of State Sen. Robert Watt.)
29. Minutes of the State House of Representatives Select Committee on Water, February 16, 1979 (statement of State Rep. Dan Kemmis). The 1974 statute had been criticized by
several commentators; e.g., Tarlock, Western Water Law and CoalDevelopment, 51 U. COL.
L. REv. 511, 539 (1980); McDaniel, Commerce Clause and WaterAvailabilityIssues Concerning Coal Slurry Pipelines, 12 NAT. RES. LAW 533, 545 (1979).
30. House Bill 230, 46th Mont. Legis. Sess., § 2(2), at 3, 1979 (Introduced Bill).
31. The statement read: "The use of water for the slurry transport of coal is found not
to be a beneficial use of water because such use is detrimental to the conservation and protection of the water resources of the state; because of the shortage of economically available
water within Montana; because such use is detrimental to water quality and is an impairment of an otherwise reusable resource; because such use is adverse to existing water rights
and foreseeable future water uses; because the present demands upon water of the state are
unquantified; and because of the undetermined hydrological relationships between surface
and subsurface water, all of these adverse effects are found to support the prohibition of the
use of water for slurry transportation." House Bill 230, § 2(2), at 4, 1979 (Third Reading
Copy).
32.

1 HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE FORTY-SIXTH LEGISLATURE 484, 552 (1979) (House

Bill 230).
33. Minutes of the State Senate Committee on Natural Resources [hereinafter cited as
1979 Sen. Nat. Res. Comm. Min.], February 28, 1979, at 4.
34. Id. at 4. Montana legislative rules prohibit changing intent of a bill prior to passage. Return shipment of water is highly impractical given Montana's high elevation relative to most slurry pipeline destination centers. (Statement of State Sen. Robert Watt.)
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committee eventually concurred with the House that a non-discriminatory ban on water use should be enacted, but not before it deleted the
legislative findings and substituted a one-sentence statement about con-

servation problems associated with slurry."
The House rejected these amendments, but a conference committee eventually accepted the Senate language, adding a prefix to the new

statement of intent to insure that the finding of conservation problems
was a legislative determination.3 6 Remarks made during final debate

by key backers of the legislation clearly indicate that water-use issues
were most important in legislators' minds. Since the state was embarking on the formulation of a comprehensive water plan, it was necessary
to clarify the definition of beneficial uses for water; use of water in coal
slurry pipelines would create an unmanageable conflict with existing
and future demands for scarce water supplies. 37 There was no indication that the majority of legislative supporters were influenced to sup-

port the proposal on account of pressure from the railroad industry. A
conservation statute that could pass constitutional muster was the major concern.3 8
Although the legal emphasis of the Montana statute has shifted
from one of non-interstate exportation to one of beneficial use, the
practical effect of prohibiting the use of water raises incidental implications affecting interstate commerce. It is appropriate that the constitutional issues surrounding Montana's law be examined.
35. The amended statement read: "The use of water for the slurry transport of coal is
detrimental to the conservation and protection of the water resources of the state." House
Bill 230, § 2(l), at 3-4, 1979 (Senate Reference Copy); 1979 Sen. Nat. Res. Comm. Min.,
supra note 33, at 4-6, (March 2, 1979). Some committee members were concerned that the
legislative findings in the original House proposal had not received enough attention to be
"bona fide findings." Letter from Rep. Dan Kemmis to Bill Bronson (Oct. 13, 1981) (Some
of the findings may have been factually inaccurate, and therefore a potential target for any
constitutional challenge to the law.) The staff attorney to the Senate committee expressed
similar concerns. 1979 Sen. Nat. Res. Comm. Min., supra note 33, at 6 (March 2, 1979)
(statement of staff attorney Jim Lear).
36. House Bill 230 (Free Conference Committee Copy, dated March 22, 1979); 3
HousE JOURNAL OF THE FoRTY-SDaxH LEGISLATURE 1285-1286; 1325, 1334 (1979).
37. Interview with Steve Carey, former legislative aide to Rep. Dan Kemmis, Oct. 15,
1981. Mr. Carey carefully watchdogged the progress of House Bill 230 from its introduction
to the closing debates.
38. The law now reads: "Slurry transportof coal. (1) The legislature finds that the use
of water for the slurry transport of coal is detrimental to the conservation and protection of
the water resources of the state. (2) The use of water for the slurry transport of coal is not a
beneficial use of water." MCA § 85-2-104 (1981). It is included among the general provisions of the Montana Water Use Act, which speak to the interests of conservation and wise
utilization of the state's waters. See MCA § 85-2-101 (1981) and accompanying sections.
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THE MONTANA STATUTE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. PoliticalPressureson the Statute
Montana's statute has not been subjected to a court challenge.
However, a consideration of possible attacks is not just the occupation
of academics. Attorneys for the Interstate Commerce Commission
have suggested that the law may be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.3 9 A federal government study of coal slurry lists
two proposed pipeline projects that would draw on Montana water but
for the current law.4° Some development interests have hinted that a
change in the law allowing export of water would be appreciated; 4 ' one
company promoting a Montana-to-Wisconsin line has recently organized in the state.42 A Texas developer has sought permission to appropriate Yellowstone River water in Montana reserved to Wyoming
under the Yellowstone River Compact43 for use in Wyoming coal-fired
generating plants, coal liquification and gasification facilities, and possibly a slurry pipeline."4 These developments suggest potential legal
and political pressures on the Montana statute, and invite an analysis
of how it might fare in a judicial contest.
B.

Case Analysis

1. Precedent Upholding State Prohibitionson the Export of Water
The only United States Supreme Court decision to address the
crucial issue of export prohibitions on water is Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter.4 ' A water company in New Jersey wanted to transfer
river water from that state to customers in New York, but the proposal
was enjoined by New Jersey's attorney general as contrary to a state
law prohibiting interstate water diversion. The company sued the state,
alleging, among other things, that the law was an infringement on the
free flow of interstate commerce. The New Jersey high court ultimately
rejected the company's claim, deciding that the state had a "residuum"
of public ownership in the river water, based on the state's clear title to
the beds and banks of all streams. What the state chose to do with its
39.
40.

Great Falls Tribune, Aug. 8, 1981, at A12, col. 1.
Suggested pipeline corridors could stretch from north-central Montana to western

Washington, and south-eastern Montana to Wisconsin. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 3, at 15.
41.
42.
43.

Great Falls Tribune, Feb. 2, 1980, at All, col. 1.
Coal Slurry Pipeline Company Formed, PuB. UTIL. FORT. Feb. 26, 1981, at 58.
MCA §§ 85-20-101 to 121 (1981).

44. Letter from Mr. Donald McIntyre, Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation, to William Bronson (Aug. 26, 1981) (discussion of proposed
slurry project in Wyoming by Jan Paul of Texas).
45. 207 U.S. 349 (1908).
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property was not subject to question.46
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the state
court decision, but on a different theory. The court neither accepted
nor rejected the state ownership thesis;47 in its place, the court held that
the law was a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate certain
matters affected with a public interest.48 The state, acting as quasi-sovereign, had the power to protect waters within its boundaries "irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land
immediately concerned." 49 As guardian of the public interest, there
was nothing unreasonable in allowing the state to protect its "natural
advantages," especially when an interstate transfer of the resource
would diminish the use-rights of all. Therefore, the state had constitutional authority to permit or deny the export of "natural advantages"
like water.5
This general principle of state control over water resources has
been reiterated by the Supreme Court on at least one other occasion.-1
Since Montana's statute has an incidental effect of prohibiting export of
state water, the Hudson rule would appear to render it immune from
constitutional attack. However, this rule, as applied to coal slurry pipelines, has come under serious criticism, principally because of two alleged defects: (1) Hudson has been overruled, sub silenio, by more
recent decisions affecting natural resource law;52 and (2) even if not
repudiated, the rule is antiquated in light of modern Commerce Clause
case law, suggesting a need to reanalyze the important legal issues sug46. Id. at 353-354. See also McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525
(1905), af'd 70 NJ. Eq. 695 (1906).
47. Hudson, 207 U.S. at 354.
48. Id. at 356-358.
49. Id. at 355.
50. Id. at 356-357. The court's language implicitly suggested that the state's exercise of
quasi-sovereign powers over water resources could be farreaching. "[T]he constitutional
power of the state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired is not dependent on any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs...
[W]hat it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will." This argument, as advanced
by Mr. Justice Holmes, closely parallels the "residuum of ownership" theory advanced by
the New Jersey court, supposedly avoided by the majority's opinion. This curious twist is
probably best explained by Mr. Justice Holmes' long-held belief that, until natural resources
were somehow "captured" and reduced to possession, they could not be considered "articles
of commerce." Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600-603 (1923) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (natural gas not an article of commerce until reduced to possession). Thus, the
state could exercise a power to pre-empt capture of natural resources Nwithin its borders
without asserting any prior ownership interest. However, it is hard to conceive of this theory
as resembling anything but some kind of an ownership interest by a state in its water.
51. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
52. Tarlock, supra note 29, at 539; Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the
Commerce Clause, and State Control ofNaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 91; 2
CLARK, WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 132 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
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gested by Hudson."
2.

Criticisms of the Hudson Decision

The first argument is based on reasoning from two recent cases
involving export prohibitions. In City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr,5 4 a
Texas statute forbidding the interstate transfer of subsurface water
without consent of the legislature was held unconstitutional, as the law
was blatantly discriminatory on its face, and was burdensome to interstate commercial transactions." The three-judge federal district court
hearing the case rejected claims by the state of Texas that the law was
enacted to promote conservation, and further denied the claim that the
water involved was not an "article of commerce" so as to escape judicial scrutiny." The United States Supreme Court upheld the lower
court judgment in apercuriam opinion,5 7 leading one to believe that it
was departing from the reasoning in Hudson.
Careful inspection of the holding in City of,4tus reveals that it
does not depart from the court's previous position on state control over
water. Any application of the more recent decision to Montana's law is
extremely limited, especially sinceper curiam opinions are not reliable
indicators of the court's position on an issue beyond the particular set
of facts adjudged.58 The district court distinguished water that is privately owned, or used under an adjudicated right, from water that is
owned and regulated, or as yet unappropriated, by a state. 9 Under
Texas law, it was well settled that a landowner had the right to drill for,
capture and use subsurface water like personal property.60 This private
property was, therefore, an "article of commerce" insofar as constitutional issues were involved. 6 1 The Supreme Court had already decided
that statutes barring the interstate shipment of privately-appropriated
natural gas amounted to an unconstitutional burden on commerce; 62 by
53. Ladd, supra note 11, at 309-311.
54. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aft'dper curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
55. 255 F. Supp. at 837-840. The city of Altus, Oklahoma, had contracted with a Texas
landowner to tap his subsurface water supply for transfer to the city.
56. Id. at 838-840. There was a hint that the legislation was purely protectionist. The
bill was passed about the same time as Altus contracted for the water, at the urging of a
legislator from the supplier's district. Id. at 832. Since a party did not need legislative consent to move water within Texas, the statute was discriminatory.
57. 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
58. 2 CLARK, supra note 52, § 132, n.90g; cf. Corker, Can A State Embargo the Export
of Water by TransbasinDiversions? 12 IDAHO L. REv. 135, 148 (1976).
59. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 833.
60. Id., citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d
798 (1955); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W.2d 279 (1904).
61. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 837-838.
62. West v. Kansas Nat'l Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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analogy, this reasoning was extended to privately-appropriated water.6 3
Except for the strictures against discrimination, City ofAtus does
not address the validity of Montana's statutory approach. Since no
water rights are allowed for slurry pipelines, there are no export rights
to be protected by the Commerce Clause. Further, the decision sheds
no light on what rule will prevail in the case of state ownership of
water, or in the mere exercise of state police powers to conserve water
resources.
The ownership issue is allegedly addressed in a more recent
Supreme Court case, Hughes v. Oklahoma.' An Oklahoma law prohibited the interstate shipment of minnows captured in state waters.
When the law was challenged, the state relied on precedent established
in an earlier case, Geer v. Connecticut,65 which upheld a similar law
prohibiting interstate shipment of wild game birds. Connecticut
claimed "ownership" of the wildlife, and therefore a prerogative to
keep the birds within its borders. 6 Oklahoma authorities asserted the
rule was equally applicable to game fish.6 7
The Hughes court rejected the "legal fiction" of state ownership of
wildlife, and in so doing, overruled Geer.68 Captured game were more
like private possessions, and state restrictions on their transfer were
therefore subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.6 9 The
Oklahoma statute was found to be an unconscionable and discriminatory burden on shipment of the captured minnows, and was declared
unconstitutional.7 °
How does this determination affect the prohibition on water exportation? Some commentators believe that, since the majority in Hudson relied on Geer as controlling precedent for state prohibitions on
water exportation,7 ' the Hughes ruling effectively undermines any attempt by a state to claim ownership or protective powers over any natural resources.72 The great leap from game fish to all natural resources
is debatable on the merits, but the Court's growing skepticism about
embargoes raises important concerns for the practical effect of the
Montana statute.
The suggestion that the anti-exportation rule has been implicitly
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 837-839.
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
Id. at 530.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 324-325.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 335; 338.
Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356.
Hellerstein, supra note 52, at 63. See also Tarlock, supra note 29, at 539.
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repudiated is poorly conceived, because it (1) fails to properly understand the role of Geer in the Hudson decision; and (2) ignores more
recent, narrow interpretations of the Hughes ruling. Justice Holmes
did not rely solely on Geer to craft an argument for state control. He
carefully established the rule from powers of quasi-sovereignty to conserve resources, and not merely some "royal prerogative" to own and
protect these resources.73 The Hughes court found no fault with this
principle of conservation.74 The "royal prerogative" foundation can be
removed without undermining the basis for state protection of water
resources.
Recent federal decisions have limited the impact of Hughes with
respect to the state ownership question. The United States Supreme
Court appears to have narrowed the construction of Hughes to privately-owned articles of trade and their prohibition from entering interstate commerce.7 5 Lower courts have not extended the reach of the
decision beyond wildlife captured or reduced to private possession.7 6 A
similar rationale was cited by the Nebraska Supreme Court in refusing
to apply Hughes to prohibitions on the interstate transfer of state-regulated groundwater.7 7 These recent constructions compel rejection of
any broad assertion that Hughes reaches a state's interest in owning, or
at least conserving by prohibition of interstate transfer, its water
resources.
The second argument purporting to address the validity of Hudson
in view of modem Commerce Clause case law is not so easily dismissed. If a state can successfully claim ownership of its water resources, as Montana purports to do, 78 then it can choose, like an owner
of private property, whether or not to place its property in interstate
commerce and not be subject to judicial scrutiny for its decision. However, if the state's interest is merely one of a police power to conserve
and protect water for the benefit of all its citizens, then judicial intervention may be unavoidable in the event of an outright prohibition on
the export of water beyond the state.
Most authorities reject the idea of state ownership of water as a
73.

Hudson, 209 U.S. at 355-356, citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).

74.

Hughes, 441 U.S. at 357.

75.

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2275 n. 4 (1980).
E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 737 (10th Cir. 1980);

76.

United States v. Heisley, 615 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Washington, 506
F. Supp. 187, 201 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
77.

State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981). The

court refused to apply the reasoning in City of Altus, West, and Pennsylvania, for the same
reasons. Id. at 708-709, 305 N.W.2d at 619.
78. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, col. 3.
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weak legal fiction. 9 At the very most, ownership can only be understood to mean a sovereign interest in the state to regulate water resources for the public good; it is not a proprietary interest like that of,
say, a farmer in his land.8 0 Arid western states like Montana may exercise this sovereign interest or police power to allocate and protect userights to water, so long as these uses are not wasteful. No court has
ever denied this power."1 This exercise may be exclusive with respect
to waters wholly within a state's borders, 2 but all waters are potentially
subject to the constitutionally-derived navigation servitude 3 and certain federal reserved water rights.8 4 Consequently, a state may exercise
control over navigable waters so long as it is not inconsistent with federal action or functions, and does not unreasonably burden interstate
commerce connected with water.8 5 These principles suggest that Montana would be on weak ground alleging absolute ownership of waters
within its borders, as a defense of its slurry statute. Reliance on Justice
Holmes' unusual concept of state authority over water, as set forth in
certain passages in Hudson, 6 would also be rejected, since it too closely
resembles an ownership interest of the state in water. A court faced
with ruling on the Montana law would probably reject assertion of any
proprietary interests and determine instead whether the law was a
proper exercise of police powers under the rubric of the Commerce
Clause.
3.

The Statute Under the Pike Test

Since the federal government has not acted to regulate water use in
coal slurry pipelines, the dormant commerce clause test is relevant for
judicial scrutiny. The general test of whether an exercise of state power
is constitutional under these circumstances was outlined in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc." State legislation affecting interstate commerce,
under Pike, will be upheld if (1) it regulates evenhandedly with respect
to interstate and intrastate commerce, and where the effects on inter79. E.g., Mortz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water R'ghts-The Slurry
Issue 23 RCKY. MTN. MiN. L. INST. 33, 38, 49-51 (1977); Goldberg, Interposition-Wild
West Water Style 17 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13, 22 (1964).
80. Mortz & Grazis, supra note 79, at 38.
81. 1 CLARK, supra note 52, at §§ 22.3, 22.7.
82. 78 AM. JuR. 2d Waters § 76 (1975). See also California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-164 (1935).
83. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1940).
84. E.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (Indian reserved water rights).
See generall Ladd, supra note 11 at 291-300.
85. 78 AM. JuR. 2d Waters § 76 (1975); 2 CLARK, supra note 52, at § 101.2(A), n. 39
(Supp. 1978).
86. See note 50, supra.
87. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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state commerce are only incidental; (2) it serves a legitimate local purpose; and (3) no alternative means of regulation are available that
would have less of an impact on interstate commerce.8 8 Unfortunately,
these tests do not define a legitimate local purpose or what constitutes
evenhandedness. 89 The court also does not indicate whether all the
tests must be resolved in favor of the statute in order to find it constitutional. There is not even unanimous agreement among current members of the court over whether this test is proper in conservation cases. 90
This analysis attempts only to present the most plausible conclusion in
light of Pike and other court decisions concerning control over water
rights. But conclusions reached here may lack permanence. Reasonable men may differ in the process of interpretation.
Clearly, the Montana statute passes the first test. Water under
Montana control cannot be used for interstate or intrastate slurry transportation. 9 One commentator has suggested that such statutes may be
discriminatory in effect, since most proposed slurry lines would run between states, therefore creating an excessive burden on interstate commerce.9" The United States Supreme Court has recently rejected this
argument as an "adventitious consideration, '93 and has indicated that
it will look only at facial aspects of discrimination. More importantly,
the effect of the statute on interstate commerce is incidental to its ultimate purpose: prohibiting a non-beneficial use of water.
Montana could also make a strong argument that the statute serves
a legitimate local purpose. The court has recognized the importance of
states controlling the appropriation and use of water within their
boundaries.9 4 This principle is most relevant in the western states,
where soil and climatic conditions require special care in the administration of water.95 While Congress may invoke supervisory control
over many state waters, the court will not act in the place of Congress
88.

Id. at 142. The test was used in Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.

89. Hellerstein, supra note 52, at 67 n.85.
90. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 343 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (in the absence of pre-emptive federal legislation, the party challenging a conservation statute must establish a far
greater burden than a mere statutory prohibition).
91. The old statute would have failed this test. See supra text of Part 11 (B).
92. McDaniel, supra note 29, at 545.
93. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2945, 2954 (1981) citing
Heisler v. Thomas Collier Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922) (tax rate on coal which does not
vary depending on its shipment in interstate commerce is not burdensome merely because
more coal is shipped out-of-state).
94. E.g., California-Oregon Power Co. v. Portland Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
155-157, 164, 165 (1935); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907).
95. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648, 662-663 (1978); Clark v. Nash, 198
U.S. 361, 370 (1905).
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and interfere with state water law. 6 These fundamentals bolster skeletal arguments in Hudson with respect to a state's interest in conserving
its water resources.
It was noted earlier that no court has denied the power of states to
declare certain water-use practices as unreasonable or non-beneficial. 97
Practices of considerably less weight than use in coal slurry pipelines
have been banned 98 without subsequent reversals by higher courts. Indeed, so long as a state like Montana acts with legitimate intent to con-

serve and protect its resources, the local purpose test should be
satisfied. 99

The legislative record in Montana is dominated by concern for the

quality and quantity of water. Admittedly, coal slurry technology
makes more efficient use of water than coal-fired electrical generation

or coal gasification processes operating on a comparable scale,"°° but
this comparison is not especially critical. Montana's decision to ban
one form of water use is influenced by the desire to provide for other

uses in the present andin thefuture. The construction of one slurry line
could significantly interfere with alternate uses of water, be they for
agricultural, residential, recreational, or other industrial needs. 1 '
Since the demand for water may exceed the supply for all potential
uses, possibly threatening the state's economic well-being,1 2 a state imposed limitation is reasonable and understandable. And, since the
courts have generally deferred to state decisions governing water use,

Montana's action would not likely be overruled as irrational.
When confronted with a challenge to the statute, a court would
look to determine whether or not selfish economic protectionist motives

were predominant in its adoption. Such motives are constitutionally
impermissible. 13 Railroad lobbyists have opposed construction of
96. Cf. California, 438 U.S. at 653, 663; California-Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 163-

164.
97. 1 CLARK, supra note 52, at §§ 22.3, 22.7.
98. Eg., Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsey-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 389, 45 P.2d 972
(1935) (flooding to exterminate gophers found to be unreasonable); Blaine County Inv. Co.
v. Mays, 49 Idaho 766, 291 P. 1055 (1930) (winter flooding of field to promote surface water
retention held non-beneficial).
99. See generally Comment, Its' Our Waterl-Can Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit
the Exportation of State Water? 10 LAND & WATER L. RFv. 119, 145 (1975); Mortz &
Grazis, supra note 79, at 54.
100. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
101. OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
102. Applications for water rights in the Bighorn River Basin already exceed the total
available supply. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 5. A 1974 study by
the Bureau of Reclamation indicated that a massive dislocative shift in Montana's economic
base would occur if demands on water for energy development were to be satisfied. TOOLF,
supra note 1, at 174-175.
103. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also Comment, State
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slurry pipelines in Montana, but there is no hard evidence to show that
their views were preeminent in the judgment of the legislature. " The
argument that protectionism can be served by legislative means, if not
the ends, is not applicable here, since courts will probably give greater
if it is a legitimate local purpose like the conservaweight to the 1ends
05
tion of water.
Montana can make a strong case with respect to the legitimate local purpose test, especially in the absence of conflicting federal legislation and any national consensus over whether slurry operations are
crucial to meeting the nation's energy needs. The final test-the alternate means requirement-may prove a more formidable hurdle.
Opponents of anti-exportation laws have argued that slurry companies should at least have the opportunity to obtain water rights
through the usual state water adjudication procedures. The state would
then be forced to critically analyze each proposal to determine if it
would lead to wasteful uses, and could always reject those proposals
that placed undue demand on available water supplies. Since some
slurry pipelines might be granted rights to water under this process, it 0is6
argued that this procedure would be less burdensome on commerce.
This claim is highly speculative, since a state water marketing authority
might always refuse water to slurry pipelines, citing a need to conserve
water for other future uses. The unwillingness of the federal courts to
interfere with state control over water policy in the absence of a specific
congressional mandate would seem to render this test less important
than previous tests. Unless it could be demonstrated that the Montana
statute barely met the standards implied by the first and second tests, a
court may not be inclined to give much weight to the third.
In another sense, it must be remembered that the underlying economic interest behind any challenge to Montana's statute is the assurance that coal can be mined and transported out-of-state for industrial
use. The statute does not prevent the mining andtransportationof coal.
A slurry line can still be constructed in Montana under the common
carrier law, which has never been repealed. Other liquid or gas media
Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762,
1772-1773 (1974).
1,:4. The former director of DNRC, disturbed by railroad lobbying efforts in 1977, supra
notes 25 & 26, believes their presence was the most influential in adoption of the statute.
Great Falls Tribune, Apr. 8, 1981, at A9. col. 5. However, there is no concrete evidence to
suggest that the primary purpose for supporting the new law was to bolster the railroad
industry in Montana.
105. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-627. The unconstitutional statute involved in that case attempted to shift one state's sewage problem to another state. It is
unlikely that this involves the same interest as protecting scarce water supplies.
106. Eg., McDaniel, supra note 29, at 545.

COAL SLURRY

1982]

are available to mix with crushed coal to make slurry; for example,
methanol,1 7 carbon dioxide,10 8 or crude or refied oil. 0 9 Further, the
Burlington Northern Railroad continues to transport coal from Montana on a regular basis, and competition from other railroads for some
of the coal hauling business is expected.' 10 A pipeline that has access to
water might involve lower operational costs for shippers and utility
companies, but slurry proponents cannot claim a constitutionally guaranteed access to the cheapest transportation medium. 1' The state's interest in water conservation has a more certain claim to constitutional
protection.
In summary, the Montana statute would probably survive a Commerce Clause challenge. It is designed to prevent a non-beneficial use
of water, on a non-discriminatory basis, with only an incidental impact
on commerce. The declared interest in conservation is not irrational,
given the legislature's concern for allocation and use of scarce water in
the face of enormous demands. The strong deference by the court to
state water policy strengthens the defense of the statute. Further, the
need to obtain energy resources is not forestalled, but is only balanced
by a constitutionally protected state interest in the wise management of
water resources. The general principle of export prohibition advanced
in Hudson is vindicated, even if not on the same legal theory. Yet,
congressional intervention could render this argument moot. The possibility of such interference will frame the discussion in the remainder
of this work.
IV.

A.

THE SPECTER OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

FederalLegislation and Water Rights

Since the early 1960's, private and public officials have sought to
involve the federal government in the construction of coal slurry pipelines." 2 Proposed legislation would facilitate construction through
107.

4 CoalSlurryIdea That May Save Water, BusiNEss WEEK, Jan. 15, 1979, at 39-40.

108. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CoNGRESsIoNAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COAL SLURRY
PIPELINES at 2 (Issue Brief No. I B75050, June 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as C.R.S. ISSUE

BRIEF].
109. Coal Slurry Lines Debated, PUB. UTIL. FORT. June 19, 1980, at 53.
110. BurlingtonNorthern's Fight to Repel Invaders, BUsINESS WEEK, Nov. 30, 1980, at
116, 121-122.
111. Cf. Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. at 2955 (implicit rejection of

claim that mere objection to rate of a state severance tax on coal shipped in interstate commerce poses a legitimate constitutional problem with the tax itself).
112. In 1962, President Kennedy suggested that the federal government promote slurry
pipelines to bolster the financially depressed Appalachian coal industry. OTA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 1. Interest waned until the advent of the "energy crisis" of the mid-1970's;
legislature granting eminent domain to slurry pipeline companies has been proposed regularly since 1975. C.R.S. IssUE BRIEF, supra note 108, at 1.
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grant of federal eminent domain powers to pipeline companies to condemn public and private lands for rights-of-way. 1 3 Application for
easements under state eminent domain laws is considered too cumbersome, since companies would face the financial burdens of common
4
carrier status and multiple compliance procedures."1
Federal legislation has been hotly debated since 1975. One measure survived lengthy committee hearings, but was soundly defeated by
the House of Representatives in 1978.'' As of this writing, another
slurry bill is advancing towards a critical vote." 6 A prime consideration delaying federal intervention is the possible impact it may have on
state control of water use."17 Certainly, railroads have had no small
role in the opposition," 8 but the water issue stimulates a ground swell
of opposition from agricultural and environmental lobbies entrenched
in the western states.
Proponents of federal involvement in coal slurry development
have concentrated their efforts on securing eminent domain legislation.
They have been reluctant to criticize state efforts to regulate or prohibit
water use in slurry pipelines, and have not advocated efforts to override
state water law.' 1 9 However, western politicians have still sought legislative assurances that federal legislation would neither explicitly norimpliedly pre-empt the exercise of state law. Legislation that nearly
succeeded in winning approval in 1978 contained clauses forbidding
judicial construction of eminent domain powers to encompass condemnation of water rights.12 0 It also prevented permitting authorities from
licensing a pipeline using underground water without an initial determination by the United States Geological Survey that use of the water
would not adversely impact the surrounding water table.'
Finally,
supra note 108, at 1.

113.

C.R.S.

114.

OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.

ISSUE BRIEF,

115. H.R. 1609, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 124 CONG. REC. H6971 (daily ed. July 19,
1978).
116. H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
117. E.g., Coal Pipeline Act: Hearings on S. 707 and S, 3046 Before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and NaturalResources, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-40 (1978) (statements of Sen. John Melcher and Sen. James McClure).
118. Madison, The Coal SlurryLobby Loses Again-But Believes Time Is On Its Side, 12
NAT'L J. 1694 (October 11, 1980).
119. Hearingson Coal SlurryLegislation (H.R. 6248, H.R. 6643, H.R. 10663) Before the
Subcomm. on Transportationand Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-134 (1978) (testimony of W.D. Jennings, President of
the Slurry Transport Ass'n); Letter from Mr. George Eastman, Vice-President and General
Counsel for the Slurry Transport Ass'n, to William Bronson (Oct. 16, 1981) (The lobby takes
no position on the constitutionality of Montana's statute).
120. REPORT OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 95th CONG., 2D
SESS., REPORT ON H.R. 1609 (§ 4(c)) (Comm. Print 1978).
121. Id. (§ 5(h)).
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provisions in state water laws regulating or prohibiting the use of water
in pipelines were protected from federal usurpation. 22 Federal jurisdiction was limited solely to the grant of eminent domain powers to
obtain rights-of-way. Similar restrictions have been included in recently-introduced legislation.12 The authority of Congress to consent
by law to state statutes which might otherwise impose an unconstitutional burden on commerce is unquestioned by the courts.12 4
The fears of slurry opponents have not been allayed. The federal
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) suggested in 1978 that socalled "savings clauses" in proposed federal legislation that protected
state water laws might not survive a judicial determination that, once a
pipeline was found by the government to meet requirements of public
necessity and convenience for the granting of eminent domain powers,
state efforts to withhold water from the line would be constitutionally
pre-empted. 25 The OTA opinion relied on the Supreme Court decision in FirstIowa Hydroelectric Co-Operativev. FederalPower Commission.' 26 Lawmakers have also cited precedents in Arizona v.
California127 and City ofFresno v. California,2 which allegedly further
diminish the effect of savings clauses. 29 Such clauses generally have
been referred to as mere rhetoric to impress the citizens of western
30
states.1
Close inspection of these decisions reveals little reason to fear their
influence in any attempt to invalidate portions of federal legislation
protecting state water law. FirstIowa did not address the validity of a
savings clause affecting water rights; rather, it repudiated an attempt by
the state of Iowa to enforce its laws regulating the construction and
operation of dams on navigable streams, an area of regulation shared
by the federal government.13 ' Another section of the same statute,
which prevented federal interference with state procedures for appro122. Id. (§ 9).
123. H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), § 5 (no implied grant of eminent domain
powers to acquire, use, and develop water); § 10(a) (government and companies to follow
procedural and substantive provisions of state law when obtaining water); § 10(c) (legislation does not alter state water laws or compacts governing appropriation, use, or diversion).
124. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).

125. OTA

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 19.

126. 328 U.S. 152 (1946); cf. Comment, Regulation of Hydro-Electric Development:
States vs. FederalControl, 2 PuB. LAND L. REV. 109, 113-116 (1981).
127. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
128. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
129. HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS & TRANS., 96th CONG. 2D SEss., REPORT ON
COAL PiPELiNE AcT OF 1980 at 34 (Comm. Print 1980).
130. Cf. Sax, Problems of Federalismin Reclamation Law, 37 U. COL. L. REv. 49, 80

(1964).
131.

First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 160-161, 163-164.
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priating and using water, was not affected by the court's ruling. 13 2 Any
other interpretation of FirstIowa would more than strain the court's
perspective on savings clauses.
Arizona v. California is also unrelated to the current legislation,
since it involved a conflict between state water law and a congressionally-established water allocation project. 133 Section 8 of the Reclamation Act certainly required federal adherence to state law concerning
acquisition of water, but it did not encompass state intervention in the
distribution of water from the completed federal project. 134 Since language in slurry legislation recognizes state control over water acquisition and distribution, Arizona is distinguishable. So is the rule in City
of Fresno, which held that Section 8 did not prohibit federal acquisition of water rights held by private or public entities through the exercise of eminent domain powers provided for in other sections of the
Reclamation Act. 135 Proposed coal slurry legislation does not grant
similar express powers, nor can this power be impliedly extended36to the
government or companies acting under federal license, either.'
Any doubts about the strength of language respecting state water
law have been dispelled by more recent Supreme Court decisions. California v. United States,137 decided in 1978, upheld a state's attempt
under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act to enforce its water laws
against the federal government. UnitedStates v. New Mexico,138 while
not concerned with a specific savings provision, held that since the federal reserved rights doctrine entitled the federal government to only
that water necessary for the purposes for which the reserve was established, the government could not automatically acquire water for additional purposes in the absence of an express congressional mandate.
These rulings should satisfy the concerns of westerners anxious about
opposition to savings clauses, and admonish the federal bureaucracy
for giving overbroad and irrelevant interpretations of judicial
opinions.

139

Obviously, the exercise of federal control becomes ominous in the
132.

Id. at 175-176.

133.

Arizona, 373 U.S. at 587-588 (interpreting the Boulder River Canyon Project Act,

for which Congress intended to create a comprehensive water allocation scheme for three
states on the Colorado River).
134. Id. at 586-587.
135. City of Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630, citing Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275 (1958).
136. Cf. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); Mortz v. Grazis, supra note 79,
at 67.
137. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
138.

438 U.S. 696, 702, 718 (1978).

139.

For a discussion of the savings clause problem, see Comment, CoalSlurry Pipelines

Are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get There, 11 ST. MARY'S L. J. 765 (1980).
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absence of any savings clause. And even if protective language were
inserted today, it could easily be removed at some future time, perhaps
in the name of solving another "energy crisis." The longevity of this
language may ultimately depend less on the inclinations of the judiciary than on the passing winds of political change.
B. Recent Developments
In a major about-face from the stance of its predecessors, the Reagan administration has come out in opposition to federal assistance for
coal slurry pipeline construction, and has evidenced greater concern for
protecting state water law."4 Secretary of the Interior James Watt publicly opposed the most recent slurry bill during congressional hearings."' He announced the administration's position that federal
intervention was unnecessary, and could ultimately threaten state control over water allocations for many projects. 142 Watt has also repudiated the controversial 1979 Solicitor's Opinion on "non-reserved water
rights," which asserted ultimate federal authority over unappropriated
waters.1 43 This decision removes another potential threat of federal intervention in state water law. The political weight of this new position
will, according to slurry opponents, effectively bury congressional approval for slurry initiatives, at least until the end of Reagan's term.'"
Some slurry companies have abandoned efforts to obtain federal
eminent domain legislation, believing that it could lead to bureaucratic
delays in the permitting and siting of pipelines. 145 One joint ventureEnergy Transportation Systems, Inc. [hereinafter ETSI]-has already
obtained rights-of-way for most of the land to be crossed by its proposed pipeline and no longer lobbies for federal legislation."4 A recent
federal circuit court decision upholding ETSI's right to condemn nonland grant railroad property 47 gives weight to the Reagan administraGreat Falls Tribune, Nov. 18, 1981, at Al, coL 2. The Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and
administrations favored federal legislation. OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at I.
Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 18, 1981, at Al, coL 2.
Id. See also Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 12, 1981, at A14, coL 4; RocKY MoUNTAIN
MAGAZINE (March-April 1981) at 32.
143. Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, U.S. Dept. of Interior (June 25, 1979).
144. Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 18, 1981, at A2, col. 2 (statement of U.S. Rep. Pat Williams). The current bill has passed the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.
Great Falls Tribune, Dec. 9, 1981, at C9, coL 3. It will face a very difficult floor flight,
however. Letter from U.S. Rep. Ron Marlenee to Bill Bronson (Sept. 16, 1981). Even if a
bill passes the House, Senate approval is not assured. Great Falls Tribune, Dec. 9, 1981, at
BI1, col. 4 (statement of U.S. Sen. John Melcher).
145. Cf COMPTROLLER GENERA.'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
146. Id.
147. Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.
1979).
140.
Carter
141.
142.
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tion belief that existing institutions can adequately serve pipeline
companies.
Several political figures believe that pipeline construction proposals should be carried out, even without direct federal intervention.
President Reagan has indicated that federal agencies may work directly
with state and private parties to ensure that pipelines are "not prevented from competing by unjust4fed impediments to their ability to negotiate for rights of way. '
The direction this apparent federal
"jawboning" will take in the field of eminent domain powers or water
law remains unclear. Interests close to the current administration remain committed to construction of slurry pipelines, even without federal legislation, as one method of supplying coal not only to the nation,
but to much of the world as well. 149 There is a distinct possibility that
states like Montana may have to forego protection of their desire for
conservation and in-state water utilization in order to serve broader
global interests allegedly connected with national security. 5" How
lawmakers will balance local, national, and international interests remains an open question.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Montana statute should survive a judicial challenge. Congressional intervention could prove more detrimental to its survival,
depending on the degree of deference national lawmakers pay to state
policies regulating water use. In a broader sense, Montana water is
never completely sheltered from use in slurry pipelines, regardless of
the statute. For example, ETSI's proposal to use Missouri River water
in South Dakota poses no immediate legal or hydrological problems to
Montana, but there may be a precedent established for upstream guar148. Excerpts of Letter from President Ronald Reagan to House of Representatives
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, reprintedin Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 18, 1981,
at Al, col. 2 [emphasis added].

149. "[The United States] must facilitate the wider use of coal. . . Our nation has the
capability to become the world's principal supplier of this fuel, but in order to do so we must
be able to transport it. It should.

. .

be a goal of the new administration to.

.

.open the

way for investment in upgrading our rail system and in the construction of coal slurrypipelines." Copulos, The Department ofEnergy, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION 236 (ed. C. Heatherly 1981) (emphasis
added).

150. Miles Costich, President of the Institute on Strategic Trade, has suggested that the
Soviet Union's insistence on supplying natural gas to energy-poor Western European nations could damage the strength of the Western Alliance. He proposes that the United States

supply Europe's energy needs. American coal would be shipped from mines via rail or
slurry pipelines to Atlantic seaports for trans-shipment to Europe. Costich, That Soviet Poeline to the West 32 NAT'L REV. 956, 975 (August 21, 1981).
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antees of downstream water for such projects. 51 Consequently, Montana could not extend its policy regarding coal slurry beyond its
borders. This raises questions about the statute and possibly conflicting
52
water allocation procedures under the Yellowstone River Compact.'
At least one proposal to divert Montana water in the Yellowstone Basin
reserved to Wyoming under the Compact, 153 contemplates use of the
water for slurry development.' 54 An interstate compact is generally
construed to be a quasi-treaty or federal statute; therefore, a state law
in conflict with obligations under the compact could be found unconstitutional.' 55 This could nullify enforcement of the statute insofar as
rights to water in the Yellowstone Basin are concerned. Since the
Compact allows Montana to veto any water appropriations, however,
Montana could defeat any proposed diversions without bringing its
slurry statute into play.' 56 Enforcement of the Compact has already
invited litigation on related matters, and it is as yet unclear what role it
will play in future transbasin diversions. 5 7
Water located within Montana but held by federal water project
authorities would appear to be beyond the reach of the statute, and
therefore available for industrial use, say, in a slurry line.' 58 Plans for
industrial use must comply with federal reclamation law, and an environmental impact statement is required for a general water marketing
program and each supply contract. 59 This, coupled with landpurchase, condemnation, and rights-of-way problems, renders largescale water projects like slurry pipelines entirely problematic. 160 Water
purchased by the state from the federal Fort Peck Reservoir can be
151. Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 1, 1981, at D4, col. 6 (statement of Montana Governor
Ted Schwinden). See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922).
152. MCA §§ 85-20-101 to 121 (1981).
153. MCA § 85-20-101 (1981) (art. V, § B).
154. Letter from Mr. Donald McIntyre, Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation, to William Bronson (Aug. 26, 1981) (discussion of proposed
slurry development project in Wyoming and its impact on Montana).
155. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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used for industrial projects, 16 1 and one source has suggested use of this
water in slurry pipelines. 62 It is not certain whether this acquired
water could (legally) be used for a coal slurry line. 163 Nor is it certain
how the technical and economic problems associated with transfer of
the water to coal fields would be solved, even if the water were legally
available. Litigation may yet arise under these circumstances.
All of these developments suggest that Montana's statute may yet
prove to be as controversial as its other far-reaching attempts to tax and
regulate such things as the production of coal and siting of major energy facilities. Conflicting views of Montana's approach to balancing
the interests of economic development, energy production, and environmental preservation have given rise to the "potentially explosive internal stresses" and the "economic equivalent of civil war" that futurist
Alvin Toffler sees leading to national disunity and separatism."
Whether or not Toffler's worst fears will come to pass may depend in
part on future opposition to Montana's regulation of coal slurry
pipelines.
Bill Bronson

161.

MCA § 85-1-205 (1981). The federal government made available 300,000 acre-feet

of water from the reservoir to Montana in October 1976 at a cost of $20.00/acre-foot. C.
BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 158, at 40. The contract was recently renewed at $30.00/

acre-foot. Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 10, 1981, at B5, col. 1.
162. Great Falls Tribune, Apr. 8, 1981, at A9, col. 5 (statement of Ted Doney, former
legal counsel and director for the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation).
163. The provisions of the Fort Peck water acquisition statute contemplate sale, rent, or
diversion of the water for industrial use. MCA § 85-1-205 (1981). Industrial use is a "beneficial use" of water under the Montana Water Use Act. MCA § 85-2-102(2) (1981), but this
definition is circumscribed by the prohibition on use of water in slurry pipelines. MCA
§ 85-2-104(2) (1981).
164. A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 332-334 (1980).

